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I.

INTRODUCTION

In late 1989, the heads of state of the nations comprising the European Community (EC) adopted the Community Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights' which sets forth the broad parameters of the social dimension envisioned as part of the coming economic unification of Europe (EC
1992). The Social Charter states that a critical part of the forthcoming
economic unification of the EC is the promotion of "improved living and
working conditions for workers." 2 To this end, the Social Charter establishes broad goals in terms of greater freedom of movement, standardization of protection, and increased equality for all workers throughout the
3
EC.
More recently, the European Commission began to effectuate some
4
of the broad goals of the Social Charter through an Action Programme
and various specific directives. 5 It states that one of its primary goals is
*
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1. Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, COM(89)471 final [hereinafter Social
Charter].
2. Id. pmbl.
3. Id. §§ 1-3, 15, 19, 24-26.
4. Communication from the Commission Concerning Its Action Programme Relating to the
Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, COM(89)568 [hereinafter Action Programme].
5. Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships with Regard to
Working Conditions, 1990 Oj. (C 224) 4; Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment
Relationships with Regard to Distortions of Competition, 1990 Oj. (C 224) 5; Proposal for a Council
Directive Supplementing the Measures to Encourage Improvements in the Safety and Health at Work
of Temporaty Workers, 1990 Oj. (C 224) 6.
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6
the reduction of unemployment, particularly long-term unemployment.
The Action Programme also calls for increased social dialogue throughout
the EC, including broad worker involvement and consultation with respect to major business decisions and increased participation in financial
matters for the purpose of promoting "greater justice in the distribution
7
of wealth."
In late 1990, the Commission issued its first group of significant proposed directives pursuant to the Action Programme. 8 The proposals deal
with the topic of atypical (part-time and temporary) work. 9 The thrust of
these proposed directives is to afford part-time and temporary workers, at
least on a pro rata basis, the same training, insurance, vacation, seniority,
and other benefits as full-time employees. 10
While the overall goals of the Social Charter and the Action Programme, to improve worker "living and working conditions" 11 and to reduce unemployment, are quite laudatory, this Commentary will argue
that the approach being taken by the European Commission may not
achieve these goals. Indeed, it will be averred that in many respects the
aforementioned documents are quite protectionist in nature, and are
12
likely to protect the citizens of the wealthier EC nations. This Commentary will further argue that this protectionist approach may ultimately
reduce the volume of free trade among the twelve member states of the
EC, and among the nineteen member countries of the newly formed Eu13
ropean Economic Area.
Economic growth is the most certain cure for long-term unemployment throughout the European Community. The implementation of the
Action Programme will reduce opportunities for growth in the EC by reducing the differences among labor markets in EC countries. This policy
may protect some jobs in the short-run, but it will limit the opportunities
for countries to trade on the basis of their individual comparative advan6. Action Programme, supra note 4, at 5-6.
7. Id. at 33.
8. See supra note 5.
9. See Peter S. Pantaleo & Leonard Bierman, Proposed Directives on Part-time Work-A Potential
Full-time Burdem?, 2 J. Etm. Bus. 49 (1990). For the British reaction to these proposals, see also Em.
ployment Department (U.K.), European Commission Goes Ahead with "Unnecessary and Misguided" Directives on Part-Time and Temporary Employment (Press Notice 221/90, June 13, 1990).
10. Pantaleo & Bierman, supra note 9, at 51-52.
11. Social Charter, supra note 1, at 1; Action Programme, supra note 4, at 6.
12. See Victoria Curzon Price, The Threat of "Fortress Europe" from the Development of Social and Industrial Policies at a European Level (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas
A&M Business School).
13. See Mark Maremont & Richard A. Melcher, Tearing Doum Even More Fences in Europe, Bus.
WK., Nov. 4, 1991, at 50, 50-52; Alan Riding, Europeans in Accord to Create Vastly Expanded Trading
Block N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1991, at Al. The European Economic Area is comprised of the EC
member states plus Sweden, Austria, Finland, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein.
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tage.1 4 Such trade increases the wealth of all trading partners and provides the stimulus for continued economic growth; more growth means
more jobs. Thus, despite the laudatory language, the ultimate effects of
the proposals on the social dimension of the European Community may
be quite pernicious in nature.

I.

SOCIAL DUMPING

The drive toward economic unification of the EC and the recent
establishment of the European Economic Area are, in part, responses to
the development of other trading blocs in the world, such as the economic unification of the United States and Canada in 1989 through the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement15 and the impending joinder of Mexico into that Agreement. 16 If Europe is to compete effectively
against larger trading blocs there has to be free trade and greater economic cohesion within the EC and the European Economic Area. Thus,
the overall thrust of EC 1992 and of the new European Economic Area is
to deregulate and relax the barriers to exchange. 17 The proposed development of a European currency is, for example, one clear illustration of
an attempt to ease trade barriers. 18
With freer European exchange and trade comes, however, a fundamental fear felt by the wealthier northern European countries. The fear is
one of social dumping. If it will be just as easy to conduct business from
Spain and Portugal as it is from Germany, there will be clear incentives
for new businesses to open in those countries where wages are low and
workers' demands for improved working conditions are not as far reaching. 19 The purported concern is that under such a construction the
wealthier countries will then be forced to lower their working standards in
14. Comparative advantage may be defined in the following manner: "In a world of competitive
markets, trade will occur and be beneficial whenever there are international differences in relative
costs of production." PErER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 14 (2d ed. 1989).

15. See generally Leonard Bierman & Donald R. Fraser, The Canada.United States Free Trade
Agreement and U.S. Banking: Implications for Policy Refoimn, 29 VA. J. INT'L L 1 (1988).
16. See generally Review Of Trade And Investment Liberalization Measures By Mexico And Prospects For Future United States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282 (April 1990).
But see Henry F. Myers, The Outlook. Talk of Trading Blocs May Exaggerate Risks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21,
1991, at Al.
17. See, eg., Aunm WiNT Er At., EURoPE Wrrotrr FRoNTtES: A LAwyR's GunDe (BNA Corporate Practice Series 1989); Riding, supra note 13.
18. See Nigel M. Healey, Whither EuropeanMonetary Union?, 256 CotEp. REv. 128, 128 (1990).
See Alan Riding, Europeans Agree on a Pact Forging New Political Ties and IntegratingEconomies, N.Y.
TiMEs, Dec. 11, 1991, at Al, for a report of the reaching of a new agreement. It should be noted that
Britain opted out of the monetary union as well as provisions on social policies. Id.
19. See Johnathan Kapstein et al., Workers Want Their Piece of Europe Inc., Bus. WK., Oct. 29,
1990, at 46, 46. See generally Stephen J. Silvia, The Social Charterof the European Community: A Defeat
for European Labor, 44 INDUS. & LAB. RE. REv. 626, 633 (1991).
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order to compete effectively with such economic movement, and that will
'20
lead, as some observers have stated, to the "Portugalization of Europe."
The solution to this dilemma devised by Germany and other wealthy
EC countries, as set forth in broad-brush form in the Social Charter and
Action Programme, is to impose uniformly high standards of worker protection throughout the EC. 21 For example, Germany has, pursuant to its
Co-determination and Labor Management Relations Acts,2 2 an extremely
comprehensive system of worker participation at both the corporate
board of directors and plant levels. 23 In contrast, various other EC countries, such as Italy and Ireland, currently have no formal worker participation requirements, while most others have significantly less stringent
requirements than those in Germany.2 4 The European Commission Action Programme, however, calls for the "[e]stablishment of equivalent systems of worker representation in all European-scale enterprises . . ."
25
including "equity-sharing and financial participation by workers." Similarly, while workers in Denmark and France currently receive six weeks
of vacation a year, employees in many other EC nations receive considerably less time off.26 Various European Commission proposals would in2
crease worker time off on an across-the-board basis throughout the EC. 7
While this approach of imposing higher uniform worker protection
standards may suit countries like Denmark and Germany, it represents, as
will be developed below, bad economics from the perspective of European
consumers and most European workers. It may also ultimately jeopardize
the efficacy of a unified common market and the operation of the European Economic Area.
III.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE BASIS OF TRADE

The underlying difficulty with the purported solution to the social
dumping problem is that it overlooks a fundamental economic reality:
trade is based on differences. 28 By overlooking this basic principle, the
20. See Kapstein et al., supra note 19, at 46. See also Europe's Social Insecurity, THE EcONOMIST,
June 23, 1990, at 13.
21. See generally Silvia, supra note 19, at 633-34.
22. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG], 1976 Bundesgesetzblatt [BOBI] 11153 (F.R.G.); Betriebsvetfassungsgesetz [BetrVG], 1972 BGBI 113 (F.R.G.).
23. See generally Michael Gruson & Wienand Meilicke, The New Co-Determination Law In Germany, 32 Bus. LAw. 571 (1977); Michael Kaplan, Comment, Is Labor a Widget: A ComparativeStudy,
59 TuL. L REv. 1517, 1540-47 (1985).
24. See Rae Sedel, Europe 1992: HR Implications of the European Unification, PERSONNEL, Oct.
1989, at 19, 22.
25. See Action Programme, supra note 4, at 33.
26. See Sedel, supra note 24, at 22.
27. See generally Pantaleo & Bierman, supra note 9, at 50.
28. See generally KENEN, supra note 14, at 13-50.
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framers of the Social Charter ignore the concept of comparative advantage which is an important attraction for businesses when choosing to set
up their operations in poorer countries. As one British executive recently
stated, "if you force Spain and Portugal to get to the level of Germany"
you will have considerable reason "not to go there." 2 9 Although some
countries may be very good at producing many things, every country will
have a comparative advantage at manufacturing specific items or providing certain services. It is important to understand, however, that the concept of comparative advantage is not the same as absolute advantage.
For example, suppose a young attorney is beginning a new practice
and she decides to hire a secretary primarily for word processing. After
advertising the position and interviewing a number of respondents in the
local labor market, the attorney finds that the best candidates can do
word processing at a rate that is a little slower than the attorney. That is,
the attorney has an absolute advantage at word processing compared to
all the available job candidates.3 0 Every hour the attorney spends doing
word processing, though, is an hour that could be spent doing legal work
which could be billed at approximately $200 per hour. Of all the candidates interviewed for the secretarial job, the best ones may have alternative opportunities to earn, perhaps, $15 per hour. Thus, the opportunity
cost for the secretary to produce an hour of word processing is far less
than the opportunity cost for the attorney, even though the attorney is
faster at the keyboard. The secretary has a comparative advantage at producing word processing relative to the attorney. If the attorney hires one
of the good secretarial candidates both will be better off. The attorney
will be able to spend more of her time doing billable legal work and the
secretary will be able to earn a higher salary than may be available to him
31
in the general job market.
Countries with cheap labor have a large supply of workers who have
few present opportunities to work for higher wages. Such countries thus
have a comparative advantage in terms of the production of certain types
of goods. The chart below (Chart 1), outlining hourly manufacturing
wages in various European countries, helps illustrate this point:

29. Kapstein et al., supra note 19, at 46.
30. See JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. SRouP, MCROECONOMICS: PUBuc AND PRIVATE
CHOICE 43 (5th ed. 1990) (using a similar example to illustrate comparative and absolute advantages).
31. Id.

154

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 2:149

CHART 132
Gross Hourly Wages in the Manufacturing Industry
(in U.S. Dollars)

West Germany
France
Italy
Great Britain
Denmark
Netherlands
Spain
Portugal
Greece
Ireland
United States
Japan

1970

1980

1989

$1.70
$1.07
$1.01
$1.32
$2.03
$1.33
$0.57
n/a
$0.54
$1.02
$3.36
$0.94

$7.36
$5.26
$4.64
$5.61
$9.33
$7.21
$4.03
$1.46
$2.36
$5.10
$7.25
$5.41

$10.25
$6.84
$7.60
$8.97
$12.44
$8.63
$6.70
$2.00
$3.38
$7.22
$10.47
$12.18

The wide disparity in average hourly manufacturing wages across the EC
is obvious from the chart. At the present time, latest available figures
show wages ranging from highs of $12.4433 and $10.25 per hour in
Denmark and Germany to lows of $3.38 and $2.00 per hour in Greece
and Portugal. Changes in wages are usually associated with changes in
the productivity of labor. 34 Moreover, wages are not necessarily static. In
some countries, wages dramatically jumped between given time periods
while in other countries they remained more or less the same.
It is critical to note that at the current time countries like Portugal
and Greece have a clear comparative advantage in terms of low-cost
manufacturing labor. The Portuguese hourly manufacturing wage is, for
example, only about sixteen percent of the Danish hourly wage and
twenty percent of the German wage. Thus, a company seeking low-skilled
labor can, for a given dollar, purchase five or six times more labor in
Portugal than it can in Denmark or Germany.
There are clear incentives for companies in need of low-skilled or
unskilled labor to open operations in Portugal and other relatively low
labor-cost countries, as they have done in considerable numbers over the
32. INsTrruT DER EtrrscHEN WIRTSCHAFT K6N, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC INDICATORs 55 (1991).
33. All references to monetary units will be in terms of United States currency.

34. See Edward Balls, EuropeanUnit Labour Costs Converge, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1991, at 1. See
also GWARTNEY & STRoup, supra note 30, at 326-27.
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past few years.3 5 Even companies that prefer the social and other
amenities of a country like Denmark will be encouraged by market
phenomena to consider shifting low-skill operations to places like
Portugal and Greece. In turn, however, if Brussels raised Portuguese and
Greek hourly wages to the same level as those in Denmark and Germany,
then, as the aforementioned British executive pointed out, the incentive
to open operations in those countries would be reduced.3 6 Portuguese
and Greek labor is simply not yet productive enough to merit the $10
plus per hour wages earned in Denmark and Germany. Moreover,
Portugal and Greece may not, at the present time, be endowed with
national infrastructures that will allow their average manufacturing
workers to earn these kinds of wages. 37 In short, a scheme mandating the
equalization of wages among these countries would hinder the economic
development in countries like Portugal and Greece because their key
comparative advantage, low-cost wages, would be eliminated. At the same
time, countries like Denmark and Germany would be helped by such a
scheme since it would remove a major incentive for businesses to set up
shop elsewhere, and reinforce any absolute advantages that these
countries already enjoy.
IV. TOTAL LABOR COSTS ARE MORE THAN HOURLY
WAGES
It is, of course, almost impossible that Brussels will mandate that all
workers in the EC be paid the same exact hourly wages, although a minimum wage has been suggested.3 8 It is important to keep in mind that
total labor costs are more than just hourly wages. Labor costs also include
various fringe benefits normally provided to workers, such as retirement
contributions, health insurance, and so forth. These fringe benefits, as
the chart below illustrates (Chart 2), vary considerably across countries.

35. See generaly Kapstein et al., supra note 19, at 46.
36. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
37. See generally WoRLo EcONoMic FoRUM, THE WORMD CoMPEnTTENEss REPORT 1991, 59, 89

(1991). See also GwARTNEa & STRoup, supra note 30, at 552-53, for a discussion of various factors,
including national infrastructure, which affect economic growth.
38. See Kapstein et al., supra note 19, at 46.
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CHART 239
Hourly Earnings Plus Fringe Benefits in the

Manufacturing Industry
(in U.S. Dollars)

West Germany

1970
$2.58

1980
$12.89

1989
$19.00

France
Italy

$1.77
$1.90

$9.56
$9.64

$12.78
$15.27

Great Britain
Denmark

$1.61
$2.40

$7.32
$11.50

$12.83
$15.31

Netherlands
Spain

$2.19
$0.84

$12.79
$6.43

$15.44
$10.89

Portugal
Greece
Ireland
United States
Japan

n/a
$0.75
$1.22
$4.33
$1.08

n/a
$3.66
$6.68
$10.04
$6.80

$3.44
$5.55
$10.37
$14.40
$15.78

A careful examination of Charts 1 and 2 shows that in some
countries, such as Italy, fringe benefits per hour are actually greater than
wages, while in other countries, such as Denmark, fringe benefits
represent a considerably lower proportion of the total wage package.4 0 In
contrast, Germany's total labor costs, wages plus fringe benefits, comes to
$19 per hour, which is considerably higher than any of the other listed
countries, even though in terms of raw wages paid to workers its
compensation scheme ranks below Denmark, the United States, and
Japan. Yet, with fringe benefit costs added in, labor costs in Greece and
Portugal are still very far below those in other countries, amounting to
$5.55 and $3.44 respectively.
As noted above, while it is highly unlikely that as part of EC 1992
wages are going to be equalized across Europe by fiat,4 1 it is a goal of the
Social Charter to increase fringe benefits throughout the EC. 4 2 For
example, the recent proposals made by the EC regarding atypical work
mandate, among other things, that part-time and temporary workers
43
receive various insurance and training benefits.
39. INsTtrr DER DEUTSCHEN WIRTscHAFr K6LN, supra note 32, at 56.

40. See supra notes 32, 39 and accompanying charts.

41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
42. See Social Charter, supra note 1, pmbl.
43. See supra note 5.
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Further, let us hypothesize that, on average, these new benefits
requirements raise total labor costs by $1 per hour. While an across-theboard $1 per hour increase in labor costs seems fair, Chart 2 shows that
the impact of such an increase will be extremely disproportionate. In
Germany, a $1 increase in fringe benefits will raise total labor costs by
approximately five percent, while in Portugal such an increase will raise
total labor costs by about thirty percent. 44 Such uniform increases in
fringe benefits narrow the overall difference in total labor costs between
highly developed countries like Denmark and Germany, and lesser
developed countries such as Portugal and Greece. In short, mandated
across-the-board increases in worker fringe benefits such as those
contained in the atypical work proposals sharply reduce the comparative
advantage that poorer EC countries have in terms of their overall labor
costs.
Moreover, economists would also include requirements of worker
consultation and participation in company decision making in the overall
computation of labor costs. 45 In Germany, employers clearly view these
requirements as costs, even with a work force which is highly educated
and which may have much to contribute during such mandated
participation in business decision making. 46 The proposed imposition of
German-type worker participation on employers in countries like Portugal
and Greece will thus levy the same, or, potentially, greater costs on these
employers. 47 Such requirements further close the labor cost gap between
these countries and the wealthier countries and thus reduce the basis for
trade.
The EC Social Charter and the planned social dimension of EC
1992 envision greater equalization of labor costs throughout the EC by
across-the-board increases in fringe benefits and worker participation
rights. 48 But, as the above discussion points out, such increases in labor
costs will not really promote greater equality among EC nations. They
will, instead, ultimately advance greater inequality by reducing the
comparative advantage of lesser developed European countries. The
proposals, in the name of protecting against social dumping, will operate
44. German total wages are $19, so a $1 increase will represent a 5.26% boost of overall wages.
In Portugal, however, total wages are only $3.44, so a $1 increase will represent a 29.4% jump in total
wages. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
45. See generally AmEN A. ALCHIAN & WiLuiam R. AULN, ExcHANGo AND PRODuCnoN:
COMPETTON, COORDINAMON AND CONTROL 393-94 (2d ed. 1977).
46. Under the present German codetermination law, companies with more than 2000 employees
are required to put employees on their supervisory boards. MitbestG, 1976 BGBI. 11153.
47. Portuguese and Greek workers are generally less well educated than workers in Germany and
will most likely, on average, contribute less to boardroom and other strategic business decision
making.
48. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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to protect countries like Germany and Denmark, at the expense of
countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain.
V. LOW WAGES NEED NOT BE PERMANENT
While some observers may see across-the-board increases in fringe
and other worker benefits as helping workers in poorer countries by raising their standard of living,4 9 such help will be of an extremely temporary
nature. New employer requirements will raise the cost of doing business
in these lesser developed countries relative to other EC countries, and
eliminate the comparative advantage that they currently enjoy in terms of
low wages. Indeed, the best way to increase low wages in these countries
is to encourage trading based on each country's comparative advantage.
As the economic developments in Japan over the past two decades illustrate, low wages need not be permanent, and are best overcome when
trade increases the demand for goods which a country can produce when
it has a comparative advantage.
In 1970, as Charts 1 and 2 point out, Japanese hourly wages were
$0.94 and wages plus formal fringe benefits were $1.08. Approximately
two decades later, Japanese wages are over $12 per hour, and wages and
fringe benefits are approximately $16 per hour.5 0 Manufacturing wages in
Japan, which were about one-quarter of those in the United States in
1970, are significantly higher than those in the United States today.
This progression represents a valedictory to the concept of trading
on the basis of comparative advantage. The relatively low wages and eager work force gave Japan, in the early 1970s, a clear comparative advantage in the manufacture of certain goods such as automobiles. Japan was
able to offer quality products at relatively low prices. These products appealed to consumers throughout the world and increased demand for Jap51
anese products.
As these sales increased throughout the world, there was an obvious
concomitant increase in the demand for Japanese labor, an increase which
has continually bid up wages and other compensation for Japanese workers. 52 The increased demand for Japanese labor prompted Japanese companies to invest more time and money into training workers and to
purchasing the most up-to-date machinery and technology for these work49. See generally Silvia, supra note 19, at 634-39, for a discussion of the debate over the passage
of the Social Charter.
50. See supra notes 32, 39 and accompanying charts.
51. For example, by 1981, Japanese automobile imports represented almost 22 percent of all
automobile sales in the United-States. See MuRRAY L. WEIDENBAUM, BusINEss, GOVERNMENT AND THE
PUBUC 279 (3d ed. 1986).
52. See supra notes 32, 39 and accompanying charts.
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ers to use.5 3 This increased dedication to capital investment and worker
training made Japanese workers even more productive, enabling them to
make even better products. Today Japan has high-cost labor, but that
labor is very productive and extremely competitive.
The deregulatory aspects of EC 1992 will make it even easier for
goods made in the poorer EC countries to be sold in the wealthier countries. Thus one can expect companies to be even more eager to take advantage of the comparatively low wages these countries offer. From this
perspective, the removal of EC-wide trade barriers and other deregulatory
aspects of EC 1992 could prove a bonanza for the lesser developed European countries such as Portugal, Greece, and Spain. Indeed, as Charts 1
and 2 illustrate, Spanish workers already have realized sharp benefits as a
result of increased foreign investment in Spain during the past two decades. Spanish workers have seen their total compensation package
(wages plus formal fringe benefits) increase by approximately 1300 percent during this time period. 54 This increase is 500-600 percent greater
than that which occurred in Germany, Greece, France, and The Nether55
lands during the same time period.
While the less developed EC nations may not all end up as the next
Japan, the same general economic phenomenon which took place in Japan
over the past two decades may well take place in these countries. As more
companies invest in these countries and more consumers buy their goods,
wages will be bid higher. Unlike the sort of Pyrrhic victory which is
achieved for workers by way of an edict simply mandating higher wages,
real gains in productivity will enable workers to earn better wages over a
56
continuing period of time.
VI.

SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS

The social dumping fears of Germany, Denmark, and other highly
industrialized, high-wage EC countries, really seem to be classic fears of
competition and substitution in the context of freer trade. 57 Their fears
are that with the advent of EC 1992, companies will have a greater incentive to "substitute" investment and business in these industrialized countries, with investment and business in countries like Portugal, Greece, and
53. See generally WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 37, at 73 (ranking Japan number one of all
OECD countries in terms of in-company training and compulsory education expenditures). The
United States, Germany, and Canada are also part of the OECD.
54. See supra notes 32, 39 and accompanying charts.
55. Id.
56. See generally KENEN, supra note 14, at 13-50.
57. See generally ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 45, at 386-92. See also John T. Addison & W.
Stanley Siebert, T7e Socia Charterof the European Community: Evolution and Controversies, 44 INDUS. &
LA. RE. REv. 597, 617-23 (1991).
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Spain. Thus, by raising the cost of doing business in countries that currently have a competitive labor cost advantage, the wealthier, more developed countries hope that competition and substitution will not occur.
These fears, however, are probably somewhat exaggerated, and it
seems that countries like Germany should view the production that will
go on in places like Portugal and Greece as complementary to their production capacity. The German work force, for example, is extraordinarily
well educated and highly skilled. Moreover, Germany has an excellent
economic infrastructure and network of suppliers. Thus, while German
labor is very expensive, it is also very productive, a fact documented in a
recent study comparing wages and productivity among German, French,
Italian, and British workers. The study found that while German workers
earned as much as 35 percent more than workers in some of these other
countries, their productivity was in turn as much as 35 percent higher.58
Consequently, high technology companies are going to continue to operate and expand in Germany. Such companies are relatively unlikely to set
up shop in Portugal since the workers in Portugal do not yet have compa59
rable education, skills, and training.
On the other hand, workers in places like Portugal can do lower
skilled textile manufacturing and other types of work quite successfully.
With the removal of trade barriers, which is a goal of both EC 1992 and
of the new European Economic Area countries, manufactured goods from
countries with low labor costs can be shipped and sold at low prices in
Germany. German consumers will then benefit from these low-priced
goods, while their productive capacities are utilized in more remunerative
endeavors. Thus, Portuguese production can benefit Germany by providing German consumers with lower priced goods. Each country is thus
able to specialize in the production of the goods and services it can produce most cheaply. Ultimately, instead of being substitutes for German
production, Portuguese manufactured goods may actually end up being
positive complements to such production. 60 In short, the competitive
threat of social dumping envisioned by the Germans, Danes, and others
may not be nearly as great as it appears to be.
VII.

PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS

While the analysis presented above suggests that raising wages and
other labor costs by fiat is generally bad economic policy for European
consumers and workers, such an approach may be politically correct from
58. Balls, supra note 34, at I.
59. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, sura note 45, at 372-73.
60. See genera!y i at 373-74 & n.7.
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the perspective of certain politicians and interest groups. 61 Thus, political
and popular support for the Social Charter and the Action Programme is
not entirely the result of misguided economic analyses.
Competition in product markets forces firms to produce as efficiently
as possible. This means that increases in product market competition will
encourage firms to employ only the most productive workers and pay
them wages and benefits that are closely related to the workers' productiv-

ity. Firms that employ too many workers, or provide wages and benefits
that substantially exceed the value of the workers' productivity, will be
unable to price their products high enough in competitive product markets to cover the costs of their labor force. When these firms incur operating losses or earn rates of return that are too low to cover their costs,
they must begin to reduce costs if they are to survive. Usually this means
reducing the size of their work force as in the case of Renault, whose
Chairman, Raymond Levy, predicts a reduction of forty percent in his
work force by 1999 if Renault is to compete successfully with Japanese
62
automakers in the European market.
The long-term effects of such competition will mean better cars at
lower prices for consumers and a reallocation of French workers to jobs
where their skills will be more valuable, thus expanding France's ability to
compete in other product markets. This reallocation of workers will not
take place instantly, however, and may last for years or even a decade. It
will be painful for all unemployed workers but especially for those who are
older. Older workers require the most retraining to be competitive and
have the greatest difficulty relocating to other areas where their skills may
be in demand.
Unions, business associations whose members enjoy protected markets, and communities where protected firms are located, all have reason
to resist the changes that freer trade may bring. Voters in these categories
will be losers, at least in the short run. The benefits of reallocating the
work force to more efficient uses in the economy will not occur for some
time, certainly not before several elections have taken place. Therefore,
politicians who represent these interests, who desire to represent these
interests, or whose political affiliations are tied to these interests, will have
63
reason to resist the move to freer trade.
As indicated earlier, those who will benefit the most from freer trade
are consumers but they often do not realize how much they may benefit
61. See generally PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONsmmoMNAL EcONOMICs Games D. Gwartney &Richard
E. Wagner, eds., 1988).
62. Renault Sees Need to Eliminate Jobs; N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1991, at 35.
63. See generally James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of
Representative Government, in PUBuC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 61, at 3, 8-9.
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in the future and, even if they do, they are not as well organized politically
as unions, business associations, or local community organizations. As a
result, these better informed and organized interests often are more effective politically than consumers. The other winners from free trade are
those who want to enter the protected markets and trade on the basis of
their comparative advantage, but these people usually are from outside
on
the local political district, or the country, and have far less influence
64
political decision making in the locale or country for that reason.
It is understandable, then, that some of the support for the social
dimension proposals is likely to come from those politicians and bureaucrats with ties to organized interests who may be adversely affected in the
short run by freer trade. It is also true that those who will benefit the
most from freer trade, consumers and workers who will enjoy expanded
opportunities, may be under-represented in the political arena because
they are not as well organized.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In a recent editorial, The Economist pointed out that the European
Commission, through its Social Charter and other social dimension prokilling some of the lesser developed EC countries
posals may end ' 6up
"with kindness." 5 This assessment seems correct. By essentially mandating that all European workers be afforded the same benefits and rights as
German workers, these proposals are going to end up making workers in
countries like Portugal, Greece, and Spain less able to compete effectively.
The key comparative advantage these workers have, their low-cost labor,
is being taken away from them.
The "freer trade" aspects of EC 1992 will clearly help workers in lowwage countries and benefit consumers throughout the EC. However,
there will be adjustments in some countries, as trade on the basis of comparative advantage results in some unemployment in protected industries.
It should be noted, though, that such unemployment is most likely to
occur in the wealthier EC countries, which have the most extensive social
security systems and safety nets to help minimize the effects of unemployment on workers. Some of the proposals being considered as part of the
social dimension will clearly have pernicious effects for workers in poorer
countries and for consumers in all EC countries. Moreover, they will ultimately reduce some of the potential benefits of a true single market in the
EC.

64. Id. at 9-10.
65. See Europe's Soci Insecurity, supra note 20, at 13.

